syft-generation
Generates, scans, and diffs Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) with the Anchore stack - Syft generation from container images / directories / archives across OCI / Docker / Singularity formats (output CycloneDX-JSON / SPDX-JSON / Syft-JSON / table / GitHub-JSON, cosign attestation); the paired generate + scan workflow with Grype (`grype sbom:./sbom.json`, `--fail-on high`, `--only-fixed`, `.grype.yaml` ignore rules with mandatory `expires:`, EPSS/KEV prioritization); and SBOM-to-SBOM diffing via `cyclonedx diff --component-versions` to gate CI on net-new components and detect supply-chain drift between builds. Use when the team needs SBOM artifacts for compliance (US EO 14028, EU CRA, FDA medical-device guidance), SBOM-driven vulnerability scanning, or dependency-drift detection between releases.
Install with skills.sh (any agent)
npx skills add testland/qa --skill syft-generationsyft-generation
Overview
Per github.com/anchore/syft (opens in new window), Syft generates SBOMs from "container images, filesystems, archives" (OCI, Docker, Singularity). The SBOM is the input artifact for vuln scanning with Grype (Step 7), for SBOM-to-SBOM drift diffing (Step 8), and for compliance delivery in SPDX or CycloneDX format.
SBOMs are mandated by US EO 14028 (software sold to federal agencies), the EU Cyber Resilience Act (products with digital elements, in effect 2024+), and FDA medical-device guidance; internal supply-chain audits also need a full dependency manifest.
When to use
Step 1 - Install
Per sf-gh (opens in new window):
# curl install
curl -sSfL https://get.anchore.io/syft | sudo sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
# Homebrew
brew install syft
# Docker
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/scan" anchore/syft scan dir:/scan -o cyclonedx-jsonOther paths (consult sf-gh (opens in new window)): Scoop, Chocolatey, Nix.
Step 2 - Basic SBOM generation
Per sf-gh (opens in new window):
# Container image
syft alpine:latest
# Local directory
syft ./my-project
# Specific output format to stdout
syft <image> -o cyclonedx-json
# Multiple formats to files in one pass
syft <image> -o spdx-json=./spdx.json -o cyclonedx-json=./cdx.jsonThe default output is the table format (human-readable); use explicit -o for machine-readable formats in CI.
Step 3 - Output format catalog
Per sf-gh (opens in new window), the common formats are cyclonedx-json (CycloneDX 1.5+, broad support), spdx-json (SPDX 2.3, preferred by US federal procurement), and syft-json (richest metadata). For Grype scan input (Step 7) use syft-json or cyclonedx-json; for compliance delivery the consumer dictates (SPDX-JSON US federal, CycloneDX-JSON most EU) - see sbom-formats for the format-choice guidance. The full format catalog is in references/formats.md.
Step 4 - Source types
Per sf-gh (opens in new window), the common sources are a local Docker image (syft alpine:latest), a remote registry (syft registry:docker.io/alpine:latest), an archive (syft oci-archive:./image.tar), and a directory (syft dir:./my-project). The full source-type syntax table is in references/formats.md.
Step 5 - Attestation pattern (cosign)
For supply-chain integrity, attach the SBOM to the container image via Sigstore cosign:
# Generate SBOM
syft my-image:1.0 -o cyclonedx-json=sbom.json
# Sign + attach to image (Sigstore)
cosign attest --predicate sbom.json --type cyclonedx my-image:1.0
# Verify
cosign verify-attestation --type cyclonedx my-image:1.0The attestation lives alongside the image in the registry; downstream consumers can verify provenance + retrieve the SBOM.
Step 6 - False-positive triage analogue
Syft generates inventories, not findings - there's no FP triage per se. The analogue here is inventory accuracy: ensuring Syft correctly identifies all components.
| Mechanism | Use |
|---|---|
--exclude=PATH_PATTERN | Skip directories from scan (vendor / generated) |
--catalogers=CATALOGER | Restrict to specific catalogers (e.g., npm, python) |
--source-name=NAME / --source-version=VERSION | Override SBOM-level metadata |
--platform=linux/amd64 | Target specific platform for multi-arch images |
Inventory accuracy validation:
# Compare two SBOMs (e.g., before vs after a build change)
syft image:1.0 -o syft-json=v1-sbom.json
syft image:1.1 -o syft-json=v1.1-sbom.json
diff <(jq -S . v1-sbom.json) <(jq -S . v1.1-sbom.json)If Syft misses a component (false negative on inventory), the downstream vuln scan misses any CVEs against that component. Periodic accuracy validation against known dependencies catches this.
Step 7 - Generate + scan workflow (Grype)
Grype is the Anchore vuln scanner that pairs with Syft. Per github.com/anchore/grype (opens in new window), three input modes:
| Input mode | Use |
|---|---|
| Container image | grype alpine:latest (Grype generates SBOM internally) |
| Directory | grype ./my-project (filesystem scan) |
| SBOM input | grype sbom:./sbom.json (no re-generation; faster + auditable) |
The SBOM-input mode is the recommended production pattern: generate the SBOM once via Syft (Step 2), attest via cosign (Step 5), then scan the SBOM. Decoupling gives an audit trail and allows re-scanning with a refreshed vuln DB without re-building. Per gr-gh (opens in new window), coverage spans major OS package ecosystems (Alpine, Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL, Amazon Linux) and language packages (Ruby, Java, JavaScript, Python, .NET, Go, PHP, Rust).
# Install
curl -sSfL https://get.anchore.io/grype | sudo sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
# Scan the Syft-generated SBOM (recommended)
grype sbom:./sbom.json
# Output formats: table (default) / json / sarif / cyclonedx-json / template
grype sbom:./sbom.json -o sarif # GitHub Code Scanning
grype sbom:./sbom.json -o json # EPSS + KEV + risk-score annotations
# CI gate: exit 1 at/above severity; focus on upgradable findings
grype sbom:./sbom.json --fail-on high --only-fixedSeverity levels per gr-gh (opens in new window): critical, high, medium, low, negligible, unknown. The JSON output annotates findings with EPSS, KEV, and risk scoring for downstream prioritization.
Suppression (MANDATORY triage): Grype's native path is .grype.yaml ignore rules - per-CVE, per-package+version, or pattern-based (fix-state), each with a mandatory expires: date and a reachability reason:. Full config + justification template: references/grype-ignore-rules.md. OpenVEX status assertions (not_affected / fixed / etc., see vex-author) filter findings in a signed, machine-readable way. Audit ignore entries quarterly; expired entries are removed.
DB management for CI determinism - Grype's DB updates multiple times per day; pin per scan or results vary run to run:
grype db update # manual refresh
grype db status
grype db import grype-db-v6-2026-05-06.tar.gz # pinned version for CICI wiring - anchore/scan-action wraps Grype + SARIF upload:
- uses: anchore/scan-action@v5
with:
sbom: sbom.cyclonedx.json
fail-build: true
severity-cutoff: high
output-format: sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with: { sarif_file: results.sarif }Grype's DB is Anchore-curated; coverage differs from OSV.dev / Snyk / NVD - pair with osv-scanner or snyk-test for consensus. No reachability analysis: every CVE on a declared component counts.
Step 8 - Diffing SBOMs across versions
An SBOM diff turns two point-in-time inventories into a change signal: which components are net-new, removed, or version-changed between image or build versions. Per github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-cli (opens in new window), the CycloneDX CLI provides a first-class diff subcommand accepting any two CycloneDX BOMs (XML, JSON, or Protobuf):
# Install: brew install cyclonedx/cyclonedx/cyclonedx-cli
# or: docker run cyclonedx/cyclonedx-cli ...
# Generate both inventories with the SAME source type + format
syft myapp:1.0 -o cyclonedx-json=sbom-v1.0.json
syft myapp:1.1 -o cyclonedx-json=sbom-v1.1.json
# Human-readable diff
cyclonedx diff sbom-v1.0.json sbom-v1.1.json --component-versions
# Machine-readable diff for CI gate logic
cyclonedx diff sbom-v1.0.json sbom-v1.1.json \
--component-versions --output-format json > diff-result.jsonKey flags per cdx-cli-gh (opens in new window): --component-versions (the signal flag - reports added / removed / version-changed components; without it only structural BOM changes are reported), --from-format / --to-format (autodetect / json / xml / protobuf), --output-format (text / json).
The JSON output carries three lists: added (net-new deps - review every entry: expected transitive dep, base-image update, or supply-chain risk), removed (may hide a dep renamed by a packaging change), and modified (version changes with old + new values). Minimal CI gate:
ADDED=$(jq '.added | length' diff-result.json)
if [ "$ADDED" -gt "0" ]; then
echo "::error::Net-new components detected. Review diff-result.json."
jq '.added' diff-result.json
exit 1
fiThe full GitHub Actions gate with allowlist-subtraction, plus the nightly-drift workflow (diff production tag vs last known-good SBOM, rotate the baseline only on a clean diff), are in references/diff-ci-workflows.md.
Diff rules of thumb: always pass --component-versions; generate both SBOMs with the same tool, format, and source type (dir: vs image scope mismatch produces noisy diffs); diff multi-arch images per-platform (--platform=linux/amd64 on both runs); SPDX SBOMs need cyclonedx convert first. The diff shows inventory change, not vulnerability change - scan net-new components with Grype (Step 7).
Step 9 - CI integration
jobs:
sbom:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0
with:
path: ./
format: cyclonedx-json
output-file: sbom.cyclonedx.json
- uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0
with:
path: ./
format: spdx-json
output-file: sbom.spdx.json
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: sboms
path: sbom.*.jsonThe anchore/sbom-action GHA wraps Syft + handles GitHub dependency-graph submission automatically when format: github-json.
Step 10 - Composition with sister tools
| Sister tool | Use |
|---|---|
sbom-formats | Reference for CycloneDX + SPDX schemas and format choice |
trivy-image | Alternative scanner (built-in SBOM gen + scan in one pass) |
vex-author | OpenVEX documents that filter Grype findings (Step 7) |
osv-scanner | Cross-plugin: also accepts SBOM input |
Anti-patterns
| Anti-pattern | Why it fails | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Generate SBOM only at release time | Misses build-time inventory differences | Generate per CI build + attest |
| Use single format only | Different consumers need different formats | Generate both CycloneDX + SPDX (Step 2) |
| Skip platform targeting on multi-arch images | Misses platform-specific deps | --platform=linux/amd64 (Step 6) |
| Generate SBOM but don't attest / sign | Provenance unverifiable downstream | Cosign attest pattern (Step 5) |
| Trust Syft inventory without validation | Misses components → misses CVEs | Periodic accuracy check (Step 6) |
| Re-generate SBOM via Grype on every scan | Slow + non-deterministic; SBOM lives outside scan | Use sbom: input mode (Step 7) |
.grype.yaml ignore without expires: | Permanent debt | Mandatory expires: (Step 7) |
| Skip Grype DB pin in CI | Different DB version per run; non-deterministic | Pin DB version (Step 7) |
Diff without --component-versions | Reports only structural BOM changes, not inventory delta | Always pass the flag (Step 8) |
| Diff SBOMs from different tools / scan depths | Format + scope mismatches appear as false diffs | Same generator, format, source type (Step 8) |
Limitations
References
SBOM-diff CI workflows
View source (opens in new window)SBOM-diff CI workflows
Full GitHub Actions workflows for the SBOM-diff step of syft-generation. The SKILL.md spine keeps the minimal jq gate; the complete CI-gate job, the allowlist pattern, and the nightly drift-detection workflow live here.
CI gate on net-new components
- name: SBOM diff gate
run: |
ADDED=$(jq '.added | length' diff-result.json)
echo "Net-new components: $ADDED"
if [ "$ADDED" -gt "0" ]; then
echo "::error::Net-new components detected. Review diff-result.json."
jq '.added' diff-result.json
exit 1
fiTo allow a pre-approved set of additions (a known intentional dependency upgrade), maintain an allowlist and subtract matches before the count check:
UNAPPROVED=$(jq --rawfile allow allowlist.txt \
'[.added[] | select(.name as $n | $allow | test($n) | not)] | length' \
diff-result.json)Adjust the gate threshold and allowlist policy to the team's change-control requirements; the CI step above enforces zero-tolerance as the strictest form.
Nightly drift detection
For production image monitoring, run a nightly diff against the last known-good SBOM rather than comparing two build artifacts:
jobs:
sbom-drift:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
schedule:
- cron: "0 2 * * *"
steps:
- name: Generate current SBOM
run: syft myapp:production -o cyclonedx-json=sbom-current.json
- name: Download last known-good SBOM
run: |
aws s3 cp s3://sbom-store/sbom-last-good.json sbom-baseline.json
- name: Diff
run: |
cyclonedx diff sbom-baseline.json sbom-current.json \
--component-versions --output-format json \
> drift-result.json
- name: Alert on drift
run: |
ADDED=$(jq '.added | length' drift-result.json)
REMOVED=$(jq '.removed | length' drift-result.json)
if [ "$ADDED" -gt "0" ] || [ "$REMOVED" -gt "0" ]; then
echo "Supply-chain drift detected"
cat drift-result.json
# Pipe to Slack/PagerDuty/JIRA as needed
exit 1
fi
- name: Rotate known-good on clean diff
if: success()
run: aws s3 cp sbom-current.json s3://sbom-store/sbom-last-good.jsonThe "rotate known-good on clean diff" step ensures the baseline advances only when the image passes the gate, catching regressions introduced in a later build.
Syft output formats and source types
View source (opens in new window)Syft output formats and source types
Full catalogs extracted from syft-generation. Per github.com/anchore/syft (opens in new window), Syft supports multiple SBOM output formats and scan-source types; the SKILL.md spine keeps the common ones inline and links here for the complete tables.
Output format catalog
| Format | Use |
|---|---|
cyclonedx-json | CycloneDX 1.5+ JSON; broad ecosystem support |
cyclonedx-xml | CycloneDX XML (older toolchains) |
spdx-json | SPDX 2.3 JSON; preferred by US Federal procurement |
spdx-tag-value | SPDX tag-value format (legacy) |
syft-json | Syft-native JSON; richest metadata |
table | Human-readable terminal table (default) |
github-json | GitHub dependency-graph submission format |
For Grype scan input (SKILL.md Step 7), use syft-json (richest metadata) or cyclonedx-json (broader compat). For compliance delivery, the consumer's requirement dictates: SPDX-JSON for US federal, CycloneDX-JSON for most EU contexts.
Source types
| Source | Syntax |
|---|---|
| Local Docker daemon | syft alpine:latest |
| OCI / remote registry | syft registry:docker.io/alpine:latest |
| OCI archive (tar) | syft oci-archive:./image.tar |
| Docker archive (tar) | syft docker-archive:./image.tar |
| Local directory | syft dir:./my-project (or syft ./my-project) |
| File | syft file:./pom.xml |
| Singularity image | syft singularity:./image.sif |
Grype `.grype.yaml` ignore rules
View source (opens in new window)Grype .grype.yaml ignore rules
Full suppression examples for the Grype scan step of syft-generation. Per github.com/anchore/grype (opens in new window): "Configuration can be managed through .grype.yaml files with ignore rules for customized scanning behavior."
Example config
# .grype.yaml
ignore:
# Per-CVE ignore
- vulnerability: CVE-2024-1234
reason: "Reachability analysis confirms unreachable; tracked in JIRA-1234"
expires: 2026-12-15
# Per-package + version ignore
- package:
name: lodash
version: 4.17.20
vulnerability: CVE-2024-5678
reason: "Test fixture; not in production dependency graph"
expires: 2026-09-30
# Pattern-based ignore (per-fix-state)
- vulnerability: GHSA-*
fix-state: not-fixed
reason: "Pending vendor fix; not exploitable in our context"
expires: 2026-12-15Justification template (mandatory in .grype.yaml)
Every ignore entry needs a reachability reason, an approver, and an expiry date:
ignore:
- vulnerability: CVE-2024-1234
reason: |
Reachability: vulnerable function `parse_xml` not called from
production code paths (verified via static analysis 2026-05-15).
Component is required for test fixtures only.
approved-by: alice@example.com
expires: 2026-09-15
re-review-date: 2026-09-15Related skills
codeql-queries
Configures and runs GitHub CodeQL - semantic-database SAST with queries written in the CodeQL declarative query language; supports `codeql database create` (per-language) + `codeql database analyze` with --format=sarif; ships query packs (`codeql/javascript-queries`, `codeql/python-queries`, `codeql/java-queries`, `codeql/go-queries`, etc.); integrates with GitHub Code Scanning via SARIF upload; suppression via inline comment + sarif-filter + Security-tab dismissal. Use when the team uses GitHub-hosted repos and needs deep semantic SAST beyond pattern matching (cross-file taint flows, dataflow analysis).
cve-exploitability-triage
Ranks known CVE findings by real-world exploitability instead of severity alone: enriches each CVE with its EPSS probability (the chance exploitation activity is observed in the next 30 days) and CISA KEV membership (confirmed exploited in the wild), applies OpenVEX status assertions to set aside vulnerabilities the product is not affected by, applies a reachability heuristic for vulnerable code that is never called, and assigns every finding to one of four buckets (Fix-Now, Fix-This-Sprint, Fix-Backlog, Accept-Risk) using documented EPSS thresholds. Treats a CISA KEV listing as non-waivable under any justification. Use when a dependency, container image, or SBOM vulnerability scan has produced more CVEs than the team can fix in the available window and someone has to decide which ones get fixed first and which can wait.
dependabot-config
Reference for `.github/dependabot.yml` - GitHub-native dependency-update orchestrator. Required keys (`version: 2`, `updates[]` array) plus per-update fields (`package-ecosystem`, `directory` / `directories`, `schedule.interval`); common optional fields (`ignore`, `groups`, `allow`, `labels`, `milestone`, `open-pull-requests-limit`, `target-branch`, `vendor`, `versioning-strategy`, `assignees`, `commit-message`); auto-rebase + grouped-PR + security-only updates. Use when authoring or reviewing Dependabot configs in GitHub-hosted repos.
gitleaks-scanning
Configures and runs gitleaks - Go-based secret scanner with `gitleaks git` (scan local git via `git log -p`), `gitleaks dir` (filesystem), `gitleaks stdin` (pipe); 100+ built-in rules + custom rules in `.gitleaks.toml` ([[rules]] with regex / entropy / keywords / tags); allowlist via [[rules.allowlists]] (commits / paths / stopwords); pre-commit hook + GitHub Action integration; plus baseline management for legacy debt - onboarding a repo with historical findings via `--baseline-path` snapshots, `.gitleaksignore`, cross-tool suppression consistency with TruffleHog, and rot-prevention cadence. Use when the team needs OSS secret scanning at commit time + CI gate, or is adopting scanning on a repo with pre-existing findings.
language-native-sast
Language-native SAST linters - the first-party "linter as SAST" family that runs inside each ecosystem's standard toolchain with no separate scanner server: Bandit (Python, 60+ B-rules, severity x confidence filtering), gosec (Go, 40+ G-rules, AST + SSA taint tracking, golangci-lint integration), eslint-plugin-security + eslint-plugin-no-unsanitized (JS/TS, 14 detect-* rules + DOM-sink XSS), and PMD's Apex security ruleset (Salesforce, ApexSOQLInjection / ApexCRUDViolation / ApexSharingViolations). Covers the shared adoption pattern - install as a dev dependency, first scan, suppression-with-justification discipline, baseline-diff adoption for legacy code, SARIF output + CI gating - with per-tool depth in references. Use when a repo needs in-toolchain security linting for Python, Go, JavaScript/TypeScript, or Apex; for cross-language or cross-file taint analysis use semgrep-rules / codeql-queries instead.
multi-tool-finding-triage
Merges two or more security scanner reports into one gate. Use when you need a single BLOCK or PASS decision from multiple scanners instead of reading N separate reports. Normalizes each report into one common finding format (a canonical `Finding`), deduplicates on a per-domain key while recording which scanners agree (`caught_by` consensus), validates a waiver (finding-suppression) file, rejecting any missing `expires:` / `approved_by:` / `reason:` or expired, enriches CVE findings with EPSS (exploit-probability) and CISA KEV (known-exploited catalog), then applies a `fail_on` severity threshold to emit BLOCK or PASS plus a bucketed pull-request comment. Works across static (SAST), dynamic (DAST), secret, dependency (SCA), container, and IaC scanners. To run a single scanner instead use semgrep-rules, codeql-queries, or one of the language-native-sast linters; this runs after them to merge output - the cross-scanner gate, not a single-scanner wrapper.
npm-pip-maven-audit
Configures and runs native package-manager audit commands across ecosystems - `npm audit --audit-level=high` (npm), `yarn npm audit` (Yarn 2+), `pnpm audit` (pnpm), `pip-audit` (Python via PyPA), `mvn dependency:check` (Maven via OWASP Dependency-Check plugin), `cargo audit` (Rust, with `.cargo/audit.toml` suppression, `--deny` semantics, SARIF, binary auditing, and the rustsec/audit-check Action as a reference), and `bundle audit` (Ruby Bundler, with `.bundler-audit.yml` waivers, Rake integration, and CI gating as a reference); fastest no-install-required SCA option. Use when the team wants fast, no-extra-tooling SCA in CI as a first line of defense, when a Rust or Ruby repo needs its ecosystem-native scanner, or pairs with snyk/osv-scanner for layered coverage.
nuclei-dast
Installs and runs ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template-based HTTP scanning: selects templates via `-t {path}` and `-tags`/`-severity` filters, controls request rate with `-rl`, emits JSONL output via `-j` for cross-tool finding aggregation, authors custom YAML matchers for app-specific checks, and gates CI on severity thresholds. Use when the team runs Nuclei alongside ZAP for template-driven DAST coverage, needs fuzzing-style probes beyond ZAP passive scan, or wants to operationalize community CVE templates in a pipeline.
osv-scanner
Configures and runs Google OSV-Scanner - open-source SCA against the OSV.dev vulnerability database; supports `osv-scanner scan -r ./` recursive scan + per-lockfile scan via `-L package-lock.json`; SBOM input (CycloneDX / SPDX) for non-standard package managers; `--format json|sarif|markdown|vertical|html` output; suppressions via `osv-scanner.toml` config. Use when the team needs OSS-native SCA without commercial-license overhead, or wants a second-opinion DB pair with Snyk's commercial DB.
reachability-analyzer
Runs dead-dependency analysis across JS, Python, and Rust projects using ecosystem-native static tools (`depcheck`/`knip` for JS, `vulture` for Python, `cargo-machete` for Rust), then cross-references the unused-dependency list against SCA findings to downrank vulns in code that is never loaded. Use when SCA output (from `osv-scanner`, `snyk-test`, or `npm-pip-maven-audit`) is too noisy to triage and the team needs to separate unreachable CVEs from exploitable ones before sprint planning; sibling cve-exploitability-triage ranks by EPSS/KEV exploitation signal, not code reachability.
renovate-config
Reference for `renovate.json` - Mend Renovate dependency-update orchestrator (multi-platform: GitHub / GitLab / Bitbucket / Azure DevOps / Gitea); top-level keys (`extends` for preset references, `schedule`, `prConcurrentLimit`, `vulnerabilityAlerts`); `packageRules[]` array with `matchPackageNames` / `matchUpdateTypes` / `automerge` matching; `ignoreDeps`, `addLabels`, `automergeSchedule`. Use when authoring or reviewing Renovate configs in any repo platform Renovate supports.
sbom-formats
Reference for the two SBOM specification families and how to choose between them - CycloneDX v1.6 (OWASP-curated, security-focused: components, services, dependencies, first-class vulnerabilities[] with embedded VEX, formulation, ML/SaaS BOMs; XML / JSON / Protobuf) as the primary format, with SPDX 2.3 + 3.0 (Linux Foundation, license-focused: packages, relationships, license expressions, Tag-Value/JSON encodings, ISO/IEC 5962:2021) covered as a reference. Includes per-language generators, schema validation, sign + attest CI wiring, and the format-choice guidance (CycloneDX for security-focused consumers; SPDX for US Federal procurement, Linux Foundation, and license-compliance contexts). Use when the user asks to write or validate an SBOM in CycloneDX or SPDX form, or the team must pick its SBOM format.
secrets-rotation-runner
Build-an-X for the secret-rotation workflow after detection - detect via gitleaks/trufflehog/kingfisher → identify provider via verifier → rotate via provider API (AWS IAM / GitHub PAT / Stripe / GCP / Azure / Twilio / Slack / etc.) → invalidate old secret → audit log via observability stack → post-mortem cross-ref. Use when a secret is detected in code (or proactively for periodic rotation) - assume git-history scrub does NOT prevent compromise.
semgrep-rules
Configures and runs Semgrep - pattern-based SAST across 30+ languages with the Semgrep Registry rulesets (`p/owasp-top-ten`, `p/default`, `auto`) plus custom YAML rules; integrates `semgrep ci` for PR-blocking gates with `--baseline-commit` diff-aware scanning, per-finding inline `nosemgrep` suppressions, `--exclude` / `--include` path filters, output formats (`--json` / `--sarif` / `--gitlab-sast` / `--junit-xml`), and severity filter (INFO/WARNING/ERROR). Use when the user runs Semgrep, asks about pattern rules, or needs a low-friction SAST gate without semantic-DB setup.
snyk-test
Configures and runs Snyk, a commercial multi-mode scanner: snyk test for SCA (dependency scanning), snyk code test for SAST (code security scanning), snyk container test for container images, snyk iac test for IaC (infrastructure-as-code), snyk monitor for continuous new-vuln alerts; policy file .snyk for ignore + patch. Use when the team has a Snyk license and needs SCA (dependency scanning) or continuous vuln monitoring; for open-source scanning without a Snyk license, prefer osv-scanner.
sonarqube-rules
Configures and runs SonarQube / SonarCloud - multi-language SAST + Quality Gate platform with built-in Sonar Way rule profiles + custom rule plugins; integrates `sonar-scanner` with `sonar-project.properties` config; supports Quality Gate definitions including new-code-period blocking, branch + PR analysis, and per-issue suppression via `// NOSONAR` comment or `@SuppressWarnings("squid:RULE_ID")` annotation. Use when the user runs SonarQube Community / Developer / Enterprise edition or SonarCloud, or needs a multi-language SAST + code-quality platform with persistent issue tracking.
trivy-image
Configures and runs Trivy for container image scanning: Aqua Security's all-in-one scanner combining vuln + secret + misconfiguration + license detection in one pass; `trivy image {image}` with --severity HIGH,CRITICAL filter; --format sarif/json (incl. scan-embedded CycloneDX; for standalone SBOM generation see syft-generation + sbom-formats); .trivyignore CVE suppression file; --ignore-unfixed for actionable filter; --scanners vuln/misconfig/license/secret toggle. Use when the team wants a single tool covering container image security across multiple dimensions, not for producing a standalone CycloneDX SBOM.
trufflehog-scanning
Configures and runs TruffleHog v3 - secret scanner with **live verification** (validates discovered secrets against provider APIs to confirm actual exposure vs entropy false positive); supports per-source subcommands (`git`, `github`, `gitlab`, `filesystem`, `s3`, `docker`, `gcs`, `postman`); `--results=verified` filter for high-precision output; `--exclude-detectors=TYPE` for noise reduction; exits 183 on findings via `--fail`. Use when the team needs verified secret findings (low false-positive rate) or scans across cloud + repo + container surfaces.
vex-author
Authors and validates OpenVEX documents - produces `not_affected`, `affected`, `fixed`, and `under_investigation` statements with justification codes using `vexctl create`; attaches VEX assertions to container images; outputs `.openvex.json` files consumed on a downstream VEX-filter / vulnerability-prioritization path. Use when a scanner flags a CVE that analysis confirms is not exploitable in your deployment, and a machine-readable `not_affected` assertion is needed to suppress false positives without discarding the finding from the audit trail.
zap-baseline
Configures and runs OWASP ZAP baseline scanning: `zap-baseline.py` Docker-packaged spider + passive scan suitable for CI gating; supports `-t target_url` + `-r html_report` + `-c config_file` rule customization (INFO/IGNORE/FAIL warnings) and Ajax spider via `-j` for JS-heavy SPAs; `zap-full-scan.py` active companion for staging. Covers authenticated scans end to end as a reference - ZAP Context, auth methods (form/JSON/script/browser), session management, verification strategy, OAuth/bearer injection, context XML export for `-n` - plus DAST cadence planning (PR-blocking passive baseline, nightly ZAP full + nuclei active layer, baseline-finding ratchet for legacy apps). Use when the user runs OWASP ZAP for pre-prod web app DAST, needs coverage of routes behind a login wall, or is designing a team's DAST rollout cadence.