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cutover-sequence-author

Sequences a multi-team release cutover into dependency-ordered gates: builds the cross-service dependency graph, converts it into a numbered gate list where every gate carries exactly one named owner, a hard timebox, and a written rollback trigger, then derives the reverse-order rollback path and the window hard-stop rule. Emits one cutover plan document with an authority table and a runtime log. Use when two or more teams must cut over interdependent services inside one shared release window and nobody has yet written down the order, who calls each gate, or what reverses it.

Install with skills.sh (any agent)

npx skills add testland/qa --skill cutover-sequence-author

cutover-sequence-author

What this owns, and what it does not

This owns the cross-team sequencing problem: several services, owned by several teams, that must change over in a specific order inside one shared window, where the failure mode is "team C started before team A's gate was confirmed" and "nobody knew who was allowed to say stop".

It deliberately does not cover the single-service release runbook: the pre-flight checklist, the smoke gate, canary observation thresholds and their statistical comparison, the human promote gate, the progressive rollout, and post-release verification for one service. That is a separate procedure, run per service, inside the timebox this plan gives that service. Write it separately and reference it from the gate row. If your window contains one service, you do not need this skill at all.

Needing a cross-team cutover sequence is itself a coupling signal worth recording. The DORA capability description of loosely coupled architecture sets the opposite target: "Teams deploy and release their product or service on demand, independently of the services it depends on or of other services that depend on it", and names the failure this skill manages: "In many cases, deployments require that you simultaneously release many services due to complex interdependencies. These 'big-bang' deployments require teams to orchestrate their work, with many hand-offs and dependencies between hundreds or thousands of tasks" (DORA, loosely coupled teams). Sequence the window you have, and put the coupling that forced it into the post-window record.

The rule that governs every gate

Rollback is a named human decision made on evidence. It is never an automatic metric trigger.

A threshold being crossed is an input to that decision, not the decision. The reason is not sentiment about human judgment: it is that "the metric is bad" does not determine what to do. Published guidance lists three distinct recoveries from a bad deployment, and they are not interchangeable:

  • Rolling back the deployment "by undoing the changes made in the deployment and reverting back to the last known working configuration".
  • Rolling forward "by addressing the issue in the midst of the rollout", applying a hotfix.
  • Deploying new infrastructure "by using the last known working configuration" (Azure Well-Architected, safe deployment practices).

DORA's change fail rate definition carries the same fork: deployments that require immediate intervention, "likely resulting in a rollback of the changes or a 'hotfix' to quickly remediate any issues" (DORA software delivery metrics). Something has to choose between those. In a multi-team window that choice also determines how many other teams reverse, so it cannot be delegated to a threshold in one service's monitoring.

What is automatic is the halt, not the reversal. When a health signal trips during a rollout phase, "the rollout should immediately halt and an investigation into the cause of the alert should be performed to help determine the next course of action", and that investigation happens "as soon as the alert is received" (Azure Well-Architected, safe deployment practices). So: automation stops the sequence, a named human restarts it or reverses it.

Every gate table below therefore has an owner column and a trigger column, and the trigger text is always a condition that puts a decision in front of a person, never an action.

Step 1 - Build the dependency graph

For each service in the window, record three things:

FieldWhat to capture
ConsumesWhich other in-window services it calls at runtime, and whether it calls a contract that changes in this release
Consumed byWhich in-window services call it
Shared stateDatastores, schemas, queues, or caches shared with another in-window service

Then write edges in one direction only: "X must be live before Y". If Y calls a contract that only exists in X's new version, X cuts over first. If neither consumes the other's changed surface, there is no edge and they are parallel tracks.

Three graph shapes need handling before you can sequence anything:

  • A cycle. X needs Y's new version and Y needs X's new version. This cannot be ordered. Break it before the window by making one side accept both versions, or by shipping the new path behind a flag: feature flags "can help you control the exposure of new code and quickly roll back deployment if issues arise" (Azure Well-Architected, safe deployment practices). A window whose graph has a cycle is not ready to be scheduled.
  • A shared schema. Two services on one database are coupled even with no API edge. The blue-green write-up handles this by applying the database refactoring first, so the schema supports both the old and the new application version, verifying that, and only then deploying the new code (Martin Fowler, BlueGreenDeployment). Do the schema step before the window, as its own change, not as a gate inside it.
  • An unowned edge. A dependency whose upstream service is not in the window and not owned by a participating team. It is a precondition, not a gate. List it as a precondition with a named person who confirmed it, and move on.

Record the graph as text, not as a picture, because the gate list is generated from it and the runtime log has to quote it.

Step 2 - Convert the graph into an ordered gate list

Walk the graph in dependency order. Each service contributes at least two gates, and the distinction between them is the whole mechanism:

Gate kindWhat happensWho owns it
ACTIONOne observable state change: a router switch, a flag flip, a scale-up, a queue drainThe owning team's named engineer
DECISIONA named human states go or no-go on stated evidenceThe release authority, one person for the whole window

Rules for generating the list:

  1. Never merge an ACTION and a DECISION into one row. The row that flips the router cannot also be the row that judges whether the flip worked.
  2. Every ACTION gate that sits on a dependency edge is followed by a DECISION gate before any dependent service's ACTION gate may start. This is the cross-team invariant. Health checks gating each phase is the published shape: "Deployments must pass health checks before each phase of progressive exposure can begin" (Azure Well-Architected, safe deployment practices).
  3. Parallel tracks get their own gate IDs and their own DECISION gates. They do not borrow another track's confirmation.
  4. Number gates in execution order (G0, G1, G2, ...) but keep a Depends on column carrying the real graph. The numbering is for talking on a call. The Depends on column is what is actually true, and it is what the reverse path in Step 6 is derived from.
  5. Expand outward from the smallest blast radius. The phased shape is standard practice: fit the deployment process to the risk profile of the service, and "push by starting in one cluster and expand exponentially until all clusters are updated" (Google SRE Book, Release Engineering). In a cross-team window each service's own expansion happens inside its timebox, under its own single-service runbook. The cross-team plan sequences the services, not the shards.

The governing principle for the whole list, from the same chapter: "Changes to any aspect of the release process should be intentional, rather than accidental" (Google SRE Book, Release Engineering). A gate that exists because the sequence needs it, with no owner and no evidence, is an accident waiting to be discovered at 02:00.

Step 3 - Assign exactly one named owner per gate

One human name per gate. Not a team, not a rota alias, not a Slack channel.

  • ACTION gates belong to the owning team. Teams run their own releases: release engineering practice "allow our product development teams to control and run their own release processes" (Google SRE Book, Release Engineering). The cross-team plan does not tell a team how to deploy its service.
  • Every DECISION gate belongs to one release authority for the whole window. This borrows the incident command model deliberately, and it is worth being explicit that the source is incident response rather than planned releases: the incident commander "holds the high-level state about the incident" and "structure[s] the incident response task force, assigning responsibilities according to need and priority", and the reason for the single role is that "it's important to make sure that everybody involved in the incident knows their role and doesn't stray onto someone else's turf" (Google SRE Book, Managing Incidents). A cutover window has the same property: many teams acting concurrently on shared production state, needing one place where authority sits.
  • Handoff is explicit and acknowledged. If the window crosses a shift boundary, the authority transfers by statement, not by drift. The incident handoff protocol is the model: the outgoing commander "should be explicit in their handoff, specifically stating, 'You're now the incident commander, okay?', and should not leave the call until receiving firm acknowledgment of handoff" (Google SRE Book, Managing Incidents). Record the handoff as a row in the runtime log with both names and the clock time.

Write the assignment as its own table so nobody has to reconstruct it from the gate list mid-window.

Step 4 - Set the timebox and the hard stop

A timebox is the wall-clock time by which the gate must be cleared, not an estimate of how long the work takes. Estimates slip quietly; deadlines are observable.

Say this plainly to whoever reads the plan: the specific clock values are a scheduling convention, not a published standard. No source cited here prescribes "10 minutes for a router switch". What published guidance does constrain is the length of any gate that includes an observation period:

"the time between each phase of the rollout should be long enough to enable you to monitor the health metrics of the workload... Bake times should be measured in hours and days rather than minutes. Bake times should also increase for each rollout group so that you can account for different time zones and usage patterns over the course of the day" (Azure Well-Architected, safe deployment practices).

That has a sharp consequence for cross-team windows, and it is the most common thing this plan gets wrong: a gate labelled "observe for 10 minutes" is not a bake period. It is a smoke check. If a service genuinely requires a bake before its dependents proceed, the dependents do not belong in the same window. Either split the window across days, or accept in writing that the window is buying smoke coverage rather than bake coverage. Do not relabel one as the other.

To size the window:

  1. Sum the ACTION durations along the critical path, the longest chain in the Depends on graph. Parallel tracks do not add to it.
  2. Add each DECISION gate's evidence-gathering time on that path.
  3. Add slack, conventionally 20 to 30 percent of the total. This figure is a practitioner convention, not a published standard.
  4. Compare against the window length. If it does not fit, cut a service out of the window. Do not shrink observation time to make the arithmetic work.

The hard stop is one wall-clock time for the whole window, set once, in the plan. Reaching it with gates incomplete triggers the reverse-order rollback path from Step 6. Extending past it is allowed, but only as an explicit DECISION gate called by the same named release authority, recorded in the log with a reason. Emergency acceleration follows the same rule: define in advance "who can approve SDP acceleration in an emergency and the criteria that must be met for acceleration to be approved" (Azure Well-Architected, safe deployment practices).

Step 5 - Write the rollback trigger for each gate

Every gate gets a trigger, written before the window, with three parts:

PartExample
Observable condition"checkout smoke suite fails, or 5xx rate above 1 percent sustained 5 minutes"
Who evaluates itone named person, usually the gate's DECISION owner
What evidence they readthe specific dashboard, log query, or suite output, named in the plan

Trigger classes worth covering per service:

ClassTypical condition
Smoke failureThe service's own post-cutover suite does not pass
Reliability signalError rate or availability outside the agreed band
Latency signalA named percentile beyond its agreed band
Data correctnessReconciliation mismatch, pipeline lag beyond an agreed bound
Dependency saturationA downstream service degraded by the new traffic shape
External signalSupport volume, a partner report, a customer escalation
TimeboxThe gate did not clear by its clock time

Two things the trigger text must not do:

  • It must not name an action. "Roll back if error rate above 1 percent" is wrong. "Error rate above 1 percent puts a recovery decision to the release authority" is right. The reason is the governing rule stated above: rollback, roll forward, and redeploy-known-good are three different recoveries, and a threshold cannot pick among them (Azure Well-Architected, safe deployment practices).
  • It must not be a feeling. "If it looks unhealthy" is not a trigger. Someone at 02:00 has to evaluate it identically to how you would.

Rollback itself, when chosen, is a planned reversible action rather than an improvisation. That is the whole point of holding the previous version ready: "if anything goes wrong you switch the router back to your blue environment" (Martin Fowler, BlueGreenDeployment), and for a gradual rollout "the rollback strategy is simply to reroute users back to the old version until you have fixed the problem" (Martin Fowler, CanaryRelease).

Step 6 - Derive the reverse-order rollback path

Rollback runs the dependency order backwards. The service that cut over last reverses first.

The reason is mechanical, not stylistic. If a dependency reverses while its dependent is still on the new version, the dependent is now calling a contract that no longer exists, and you have converted a bad release into an outage. So reversal is the completed prefix of the gate list, read bottom-up.

To generate it:

  1. Take the gate list. Cut it at the gate where the decision is being made.
  2. Reverse the completed ACTION gates.
  3. Keep parallel tracks independent: a track with no edge to the failing service reverses only if the decision says the whole window reverses.
  4. Assign each reverse step an owner. Default to the person who executed the forward action, because they have the context and the access.
  5. Give each reverse step its own confirmation before the next one starts. A rollback sequence with no confirmations is a second uncontrolled cutover.

Mark the irreversible gates. Some forward actions do not reverse mechanically, and the plan is dishonest if it implies they do. Stateful changes are the usual case: "Rolling back changes, especially database, schema, or other stateful component changes, can be complex" (Azure Well-Architected, safe deployment practices). For any gate whose forward action writes state in a shape the old version cannot read:

  • Label the row POINT OF NO RETURN in the gate table.
  • State in the plan that once this gate passes, recovery for that service means roll forward, not reverse.
  • Prefer to have removed the problem before the window, using the schema-supports-both-versions approach from Step 1 (Martin Fowler, BlueGreenDeployment).

Step 7 - Check the plan before the window opens

Run the plan against these invariants. Every one is a defect in the plan, not a judgment call:

CheckFails if
OwnershipAny gate has zero owners, two owners, or a team name instead of a person
AuthorityMore than one person owns DECISION gates without a recorded handoff
OrderingAny dependent service's ACTION gate precedes its dependency's DECISION gate
CycleThe dependency graph is not acyclic
TimeboxAny gate has no clock time, or the critical path exceeds the window
Hard stopThe window has no single hard-stop time, or no stated consequence for reaching it
TriggerAny gate has no written trigger, or a trigger that names an action instead of a decision
EvidenceAny trigger cites no named dashboard, query, or suite
Reverse pathThe rollback order is not the reverse of the forward order
IrreversibilityAny state-writing gate is not marked as a point of no return or explicitly cleared as reversible
AvailabilityAny owner has not confirmed availability for their gate's clock time

Worked example

Window: four services, three teams, one dependency chain plus one parallel track.

Graph. The payments API calls the new authentication contract, so authentication must be live first. The web app calls the new payments contract, so payments must be live before it. The event pipeline consumes only published events whose shape is unchanged, so it has no in-window edge and runs parallel.

auth-service  ->  payment-api  ->  web-app
event-pipeline    (parallel, no in-window dependency)

Gate list.

GateKindStepDepends onOwnerTimebox (UTC)
G0DECISIONWindow opens, preconditions confirmed-Priya (release authority)20:00
G1ACTIONauth-service router switch to new versionG0Alice20:10
G2DECISIONauth-service smoke pass, go or no-goG1Priya20:25
G3ACTIONpayment-api router switchG2Bob20:35
G4DECISIONpayment-api smoke pass, go or no-goG3Priya20:50
G5ACTIONevent-pipeline router switchG0 (parallel)Dave20:35
G6DECISIONevent-pipeline lag and reconciliation checkG5Priya20:50
G7ACTIONweb-app router switchG4Carol21:00
G8DECISIONweb-app smoke pass, window go or no-goG7Priya21:20
G9DECISIONObservation closes, window declared completeG8, G6Priya22:00

Hard stop: 22:00 UTC. Reaching it with any gate incomplete puts the full reverse path to Priya as a decision.

Rollback triggers.

GateCondition that puts a decision on the tableEvaluated byEvidenceReverse scope
G2auth smoke suite fails, or auth 5xx above 1 percent for 5 minutesPriyaauth-smoke suite output, auth error-rate dashboardauth only
G4payment smoke fails, or transaction error rate above 0.5 percentPriyapayments-smoke output, transaction error panelpayments, then auth
G6pipeline lag above 10 minutes, or reconciliation mismatch above 0 rowsPriyapipeline lag panel, nightly reconciliation querypipeline only
G8web smoke fails, or checkout completion below its agreed bandPriyaweb-smoke output, checkout funnel panelall four services
AnyHard stop 22:00 reached with gates openPriyathe runtime logall completed gates

Reverse path if the decision at G8 is to roll back the window. Completed ACTION gates are G1, G3, G5, G7. Reversed, with the parallel track handled independently:

1. web-app router back to previous version      (Carol)  confirm
2. payment-api router back to previous version  (Bob)    confirm
3. auth-service router back to previous version (Alice)  confirm
4. event-pipeline router back (parallel track)  (Dave)   confirm

Each step confirmed before the next begins. Note that G3's forward action was marked reversible during Step 6 review; had it written transaction rows in a new shape, it would carry POINT OF NO RETURN and step 2 above would read "roll forward with hotfix" instead.

Output template

Produce one document. It is the plan before the window and the record after it.

# Release cutover plan - {release_name}

**Window:** {start_utc} to {hard_stop_utc}
**Release authority:** {one named person}
**Hard stop consequence:** reaching {hard_stop_utc} with open gates puts the
full reverse path to the release authority as a decision.

## Rollback rule for this window

Rollback is a decision made by {release authority} on stated evidence.
Thresholds halt the sequence; they do not reverse it. Recovery may be
roll back, roll forward, or redeploy last-known-good, and only the release
authority chooses which.

## Dependency graph

{service -> service edges, one per line}
{parallel tracks listed explicitly}
{preconditions on out-of-window services, each with the person who confirmed it}

## Gate sequence

| Gate | Kind | Step | Depends on | Owner | Timebox (UTC) | Status |
|------|------|------|-----------|-------|---------------|--------|

## Authority table

| Role | Named person | Scope |
|------|--------------|-------|
| Release authority | | all DECISION gates and recovery calls |
| {service} owner | | {gate IDs} execution |

## Rollback triggers

| Gate | Condition that puts a decision on the table | Evaluated by | Evidence | Reverse scope |
|------|--------------------------------------------|--------------|----------|---------------|

## Reverse path

{completed ACTION gates in reverse order, one owner per step,
 confirmation required between steps}
{gates marked POINT OF NO RETURN and what recovery means past them}

## Runtime log

| Time (UTC) | Gate | Action | Verdict | Evidence | Called by |
|------------|------|--------|---------|----------|-----------|

Update the Status column and append to the runtime log in place as the window runs. Authority handoffs are log rows. At close, the document is the release record, and the coupling that forced a coordinated window is worth carrying into the retrospective.

Anti-patterns

Anti-patternWhy it failsFix
A metric threshold wired to automatic rollbackThe threshold cannot choose between rolling back, rolling forward, and redeploying known-good, and in a multi-team window it cannot know how many other teams must reverse with itThresholds halt and page; the named release authority decides (see the rule section)
One org-wide go or no-go at the end of the windowFailures surface only after every service has cut over, so the reverse path is at its longest and most entangledA DECISION gate per service, in dependency order, before its dependents start
A gate owned by a team name or a rota aliasAt 02:00 nobody is sure who is allowed to say stop, and two people act concurrentlyExactly one named person per gate, availability confirmed in advance
Timeboxes with no hard-stop policyTeams read a timebox as a target, gates slip individually, and the window silently overrunsOne hard-stop time for the window with a stated consequence, and extension only as its own DECISION gate
Rolling back in forward orderThe dependency reverses while its dependent still calls the new contract, turning a bad release into an outageReverse the completed prefix of the gate list, confirming each step
A rollback list with scope but no order and no ownersThe reverse becomes a second uncontrolled cutover under time pressureOrdered reverse steps, one owner each, confirmation between steps
A state-writing gate treated as reversibleThe plan promises a reversal that physically cannot happenMark POINT OF NO RETURN, or make the schema support both versions before the window
A 10-minute gate described as a bake periodPublished guidance measures bake time in hours and days, not minutes, so the window is buying smoke coverage while claiming bake coverageCall it a smoke check, or split the window so dependents run on a later day
A dependency cycle scheduled anywayThe graph cannot be ordered, so the sequence is fiction and the first gate exposes itBreak the cycle before scheduling, with a both-versions-tolerant contract or a flag

Limitations

  • No execution. This produces the plan and the record. Flipping routers, running smoke suites, and reading dashboards belong to the owning teams and their own tooling.
  • Single-service depth is out of scope. Pre-flight, canary thresholds, statistical promote criteria, and post-release verification for one service live in that service's own runbook, run inside its timebox here.
  • Outcomes are reported, not polled. The runtime log records what owners state, with the evidence they cite. It is not a monitoring integration.
  • Cross-timezone availability is flagged, not solved. The Step 7 check surfaces owners who have not confirmed availability for their gate's clock time. Resolving that is a scheduling conversation.
  • Shared-database sequencing is a precondition, not a gate. Schema work that must support two application versions simultaneously is resolved with the data owner before the window opens.