Testland
Browse all skills & agents

webhook-delivery-tester

The single webhook-testing home, sender AND receiver: build-an-X for webhook delivery + receiver tests per Standard Webhooks (standardwebhooks.com) - HMAC-SHA256 signature verification, retry semantics with exponential backoff + jitter, replay-window check via timestamp tolerance, ordering guarantees, dead-letter handling for permanent failures, content-type + body-encoding fidelity - plus inbound capture-and-replay hardening (runtime-signed fixtures, tampered-payload and future-timestamp rejection, key-rotation acceptance, sanitized production captures) in references/inbound-replay.md. Use when authoring tests for webhook senders OR receivers in any system (Stripe / Twilio / SendGrid / GitHub / GitLab outbound webhooks; SaaS app inbound webhooks), including payment and realtime integrations.

Install with skills.sh (any agent)

npx skills add testland/qa --skill webhook-delivery-tester
View source

webhook-delivery-tester

Overview

The Standard Webhooks spec (standardwebhooks.com (opens in new window)) formalizes the signing, retry, and replay patterns most production systems converged on. This skill covers tests for both sides:

  • Sender - your service emits webhooks to customers (Stripe-style outbound webhook).
  • Receiver - your service receives webhooks from a vendor (handler for Stripe / Twilio / SendGrid / GitHub events).

When to use

  • The repo emits or receives webhooks.
  • A regression suite needs to verify signature handling, retry semantics, replay-window enforcement.
  • Compliance review (SOC 2, security audit) requires evidence of signature verification.
  • The team adopts Standard Webhooks per stdwh (opens in new window).

Step 1 - Sender vs receiver test patterns

Test sideLayerTools
Sender - payload shapeUnitMock HTTP client; assert POST body
Sender - signingUnitVerify HMAC matches expected per Standard Webhooks
Sender - retriesIntegrationMock server returning 5xx, assert retry+backoff
Receiver - signature verifyUnitConstruct signed payload; assert handler accepts/rejects
Receiver - replay defenseUnitConstruct payload with stale timestamp; assert rejected
Receiver - handler logicUnitPer-event-type handler tests with vendor sample payloads

Step 2 - Sender: signature signing

Per Standard Webhooks (stdwh (opens in new window)) the canonical signature scheme:

signature = HMAC-SHA256(secret, "{webhook_id}.{timestamp}.{payload}")

The signature accompanies the payload via the webhook-signature header (with v1, prefix for the version):

webhook-id: msg_2KkD9ApUQYKLn9ouQOFKjC
webhook-timestamp: 1714838400
webhook-signature: v1,g0hM9SsE+OTPJTGt/tmIKtSyZlE3uFJELVlNIOLJ1OE=

Sender-side test:

import hmac, hashlib, base64

def sign_webhook(secret, webhook_id, timestamp, payload):
    to_sign = f"{webhook_id}.{timestamp}.{payload}".encode()
    sig = hmac.new(
        base64.b64decode(secret),
        to_sign,
        hashlib.sha256,
    ).digest()
    return f"v1,{base64.b64encode(sig).decode()}"

def test_outbound_webhook_signed_correctly():
    payload = '{"type":"order.created","data":{"id":123}}'
    webhook_id = "msg_test"
    timestamp = "1714838400"
    expected_sig = sign_webhook(SECRET, webhook_id, timestamp, payload)

    sent_request = capture_outbound_webhook()
    assert sent_request["headers"]["webhook-id"] == webhook_id
    assert sent_request["headers"]["webhook-timestamp"] == timestamp
    assert sent_request["headers"]["webhook-signature"] == expected_sig

Step 3 - Sender: retry semantics

Per stdwh (opens in new window) the canonical retry pattern is exponential backoff with jitter, capped at N attempts, then dead-letter. The typical delay schedule is in references/vendor-payloads-and-retries.md.

Sender-side test:

def test_webhook_retries_on_5xx(mock_receiver):
    mock_receiver.return_status(503)   # first 3 attempts fail
    mock_receiver.return_status_after_n(4, 200)   # 4th succeeds

    send_webhook(...)

    # Assert delivery succeeded after retries
    assert mock_receiver.attempt_count == 4
    # Assert backoff between attempts (mock can record timestamps)
    deltas = mock_receiver.attempt_deltas()
    assert deltas[1] >= 5   # at least 5s between attempt 1 and 2
    assert deltas[2] >= 5 * 60   # 5 min between 2 and 3

For dead-letter: assert that after max attempts, the webhook is recorded in a dead-letter store + not retried.

Step 4 - Receiver: signature verification

Standard Webhooks signature verification per stdwh (opens in new window):

  1. Reconstruct the to-sign string: {webhook-id}.{webhook-timestamp}.{payload}
  2. Compute expected signature with the shared secret.
  3. Constant-time compare with the webhook-signature header value.
  4. Reject if mismatch.

Receiver-side test:

def test_receiver_rejects_invalid_signature(client):
    response = client.post(
        "/webhooks/orders",
        headers={
            "webhook-id": "msg_1",
            "webhook-timestamp": str(int(time.time())),
            "webhook-signature": "v1,deliberately-wrong",
        },
        data='{"type":"order.created"}',
    )
    assert response.status_code == 400

def test_receiver_accepts_valid_signature(client):
    payload = '{"type":"order.created"}'
    timestamp = str(int(time.time()))
    sig = sign_webhook(SECRET, "msg_1", timestamp, payload)

    response = client.post(
        "/webhooks/orders",
        headers={
            "webhook-id": "msg_1",
            "webhook-timestamp": timestamp,
            "webhook-signature": sig,
        },
        data=payload,
    )
    assert response.status_code == 200

Step 5 - Receiver: replay-window defense

A captured signed payload should NOT be re-replayable indefinitely. Per stdwh (opens in new window) the receiver should reject payloads with timestamps outside a short window (typically 5 minutes).

def test_receiver_rejects_stale_timestamp(client):
    stale_timestamp = str(int(time.time()) - 600)   # 10 min ago
    payload = '{"type":"order.created"}'
    sig = sign_webhook(SECRET, "msg_1", stale_timestamp, payload)

    response = client.post(
        "/webhooks/orders",
        headers={
            "webhook-id": "msg_1",
            "webhook-timestamp": stale_timestamp,
            "webhook-signature": sig,
        },
        data=payload,
    )
    assert response.status_code == 400

If receiver doesn't enforce this, mark critical: replay vulnerable. The harder receiver attack cases - tampered payloads, future-dated timestamps, key rotation, and a capture-and-replay framework with runtime-signed fixtures - are in references/inbound-replay.md.

Step 6 - Receiver: idempotent processing

Webhooks are sent at-least-once (vendor retries on 5xx); receiver must be idempotent. Cross-ref idempotency-test-author (in the qa-async-jobs plugin):

def test_receiver_idempotent_via_webhook_id(client):
    payload = '{"type":"order.created","data":{"id":123}}'
    webhook_id = "msg_unique"
    sig, ts = sign_for_now(payload, webhook_id)

    # Send twice (simulating vendor redelivery)
    response1 = client.post("/webhooks/orders", headers=..., data=payload)
    response2 = client.post("/webhooks/orders", headers=..., data=payload)

    assert response1.status_code == 200
    assert response2.status_code == 200   # both OK, but only one side-effect
    assert Order.objects.filter(external_id=123).count() == 1

Step 7 - Per-vendor sample payloads

For receiver tests of specific vendors, use the vendor's official sample payloads (NOT hand-rolled) - making up payloads risks field-name drift. The per-vendor documentation links are in references/vendor-payloads-and-retries.md.

Step 8 - Ordering guarantees

Webhooks are typically NOT ordered (concurrent retries → out-of-order delivery). If your handler relies on order (e.g., processing order.created before order.updated), tests should:

def test_handler_handles_out_of_order_events(client):
    # Send "updated" event BEFORE "created"
    send_webhook(client, type="order.updated", id=123, status="shipped")
    send_webhook(client, type="order.created", id=123, status="placed")

    # Handler should reconcile via fetch-from-vendor + apply latest state
    order = Order.objects.get(external_id=123)
    assert order.status == "shipped"   # latest wins

If your handler can't survive out-of-order, mark critical - production will encounter this.

Step 9 - End-to-end test recipe

For sender:

  1. ✅ Payload shape matches spec (Step 1)
  2. ✅ Signature correctly computed (Step 2)
  3. ✅ Retry on 5xx with backoff (Step 3)
  4. ✅ Dead-letter after max attempts (Step 3)

For receiver:

  1. ✅ Reject invalid signature (Step 4)
  2. ✅ Accept valid signature (Step 4)
  3. ✅ Reject stale timestamp (Step 5)
  4. ✅ Idempotent processing on retry (Step 6)
  5. ✅ Per-vendor sample payload tests (Step 7)
  6. ✅ Out-of-order handling if applicable (Step 8)

Anti-patterns

Anti-patternWhy it failsFix
Skip signature verificationWebhooks accept arbitrary attacker payloadsStep 4 negative + positive tests
Skip replay-window checkCaptured webhook replayable foreverStep 5
Use == instead of constant-time compare for signatureTiming-attack vulnerablehmac.compare_digest()
Hand-roll vendor sample payloadsField names drift from real vendor sendsUse vendor's sample (Step 7)
Receiver returns 200 before processingVendor stops retrying; data lost on processing failureProcess synchronously OR queue + return 200 + handle failures via internal queue with idempotency

Limitations

  • This is a build-an-X workflow. Tests use the application's HTTP server + an HMAC library.
  • Standard Webhooks adoption varies - many vendors use legacy signature schemes (X-Hub-Signature from GitHub, Stripe-Signature from Stripe). Adapt the verification logic per vendor; the workflow is the same.
  • Signature secret rotation is out of scope; pair with a secrets-management workflow.
  • For vendors that don't sign (legacy / cheap webhooks), IP-allowlisting is the only protection; not addressed here.

References

  • Inbound capture-and-replay hardening (tamper / future-timestamp / key-rotation cases, sanitized captures): references/inbound-replay.md
  • stdwh (opens in new window) - Standard Webhooks specification
  • IETF RFC 2104 - HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
  • stripe.com/docs/webhooks - Stripe webhooks reference (de-facto standard for many patterns)
  • docs.github.com/en/webhooks - GitHub webhooks reference
  • idempotency-test-author - companion: receivers must be idempotent (cross-plugin)
  • mailpit-testing (email flows in its references), sms-test-author - sister channels (bounce/complaint webhooks + STOP-keyword webhooks reuse these patterns)

Inbound capture-and-replay hardening

View source (opens in new window)

Inbound capture-and-replay hardening

Deep reference for the receiver side of the SKILL.md: a capture-and-replay framework that signs fixtures at runtime and drives the receiver through the attack cases the core Step 4-6 tests don't cover - tampered payloads, future-dated timestamps, and key rotation. Per the Standard Webhooks spec (opens in new window), "every webhook implementation needs to protect themselves and their users from SSRF, spoofing, and replay attacks."

Capture-and-replay framework structure

tests/webhook-replay/
├── fixtures/
│   ├── stripe-charge-succeeded.json    # full request body
│   ├── stripe-charge-succeeded.headers.json   # incl. svix-* headers
│   └── github-pr-opened.json
├── replay.py                            # replay loop
└── conftest.py                          # signing helpers

The svix-* header variant

The Standard Webhooks reference implementation (svix) ships the same scheme under svix-prefixed headers:

HeaderMeaning
svix-idUnique webhook identifier
svix-timestampUnix timestamp (seconds)
svix-signaturev1,<base64-hmac-sha256> (one or more, space-separated)

Signature input: HMAC-SHA256 over {id}.{timestamp}.{payload} with the shared secret as key - identical math to the SKILL.md's webhook-* headers.

Sign fixtures at runtime

Never hard-code timestamps in fixtures - old fixtures fail the replay window. Sign at test runtime:

import hmac, hashlib, base64, time, json

def sign_webhook(secret_b64: str, msg_id: str, payload: bytes,
                  timestamp: int | None = None) -> dict[str, str]:
    timestamp = timestamp or int(time.time())
    secret = base64.b64decode(secret_b64.removeprefix("whsec_"))
    signed_payload = f"{msg_id}.{timestamp}.".encode() + payload
    sig = base64.b64encode(hmac.new(secret, signed_payload, hashlib.sha256).digest()).decode()
    return {
        "svix-id": msg_id,
        "svix-timestamp": str(timestamp),
        "svix-signature": f"v1,{sig}",
        "Content-Type": "application/json",
    }

Future-timestamp rejection

The SKILL.md Step 5 rejects stale timestamps; clock-skewed future timestamps must also reject:

def test_future_timestamp_rejected():
    payload = b'{"event":"x"}'
    future_ts = int(time.time()) + 600
    headers = sign_webhook("whsec_<test-secret>", "msg_test_future",
                            payload, timestamp=future_ts)
    resp = requests.post("http://localhost:8080/webhooks/stripe",
                          data=payload, headers=headers)
    assert resp.status_code in (400, 401)

Tampered-payload rejection

def test_tampered_payload_rejected():
    payload = b'{"amount":100}'
    headers = sign_webhook("whsec_<test-secret>", "msg_test_tamper", payload)

    # Tamper after signing
    tampered = b'{"amount":1000000}'
    resp = requests.post("http://localhost:8080/webhooks/stripe",
                          data=tampered, headers=headers)
    assert resp.status_code in (400, 401)

Multi-version signature (key rotation)

svix-signature / webhook-signature can carry multiple space-separated v1,... values so senders can rotate keys without an outage. The receiver accepts if any key validates:

def test_accepts_during_key_rotation():
    payload = b'{"event":"x"}'
    msg_id = "msg_rotate_1"
    ts = int(time.time())

    sig_old = compute_sig(secret_b64="whsec_OLD", msg_id=msg_id,
                            payload=payload, timestamp=ts)
    sig_new = compute_sig(secret_b64="whsec_NEW", msg_id=msg_id,
                            payload=payload, timestamp=ts)

    headers = {
        "svix-id": msg_id,
        "svix-timestamp": str(ts),
        "svix-signature": f"v1,{sig_old} v1,{sig_new}",
        "Content-Type": "application/json",
    }
    resp = requests.post("http://localhost:8080/webhooks/stripe",
                          data=payload, headers=headers)
    assert resp.status_code == 200

Capture from production (responsibly)

For captured payloads, sanitize before committing:

def sanitize_capture(payload: dict) -> dict:
    SENSITIVE_KEYS = {"email", "phone", "ssn", "card", "address"}
    def walk(node):
        if isinstance(node, dict):
            return {k: ("***" if k.lower() in SENSITIVE_KEYS else walk(v))
                     for k, v in node.items()}
        if isinstance(node, list):
            return [walk(x) for x in node]
        return node
    return walk(payload)

Replaying captured production payloads is also the fastest outage-retro tool: was the failure a webhook storm or a real bug?

Anti-patterns

Anti-patternWhy it failsFix
Skip signature test in dev (mock the verifier)Prod-only signature bug shipsUse the same verifier in test as prod
Hard-code timestamps in fixturesOld fixtures fail windowed-replay protectionSign at test runtime
Commit raw production payloadsPII leak in repoSanitize before commit
Use single key, no rotation pathForced re-signing at rotation; outage riskMulti-key acceptance test

Sources

Webhook retry schedules and per-vendor payloads

View source (opens in new window)

Webhook retry schedules and per-vendor payloads

Reference data for webhook-delivery-tester. The core signing, verification, and replay test code stays in SKILL.md; this file holds the lookup table and per-vendor specifics that do not need to sit in the workflow spine.

Canonical retry schedule

Per Standard Webhooks (opens in new window), senders retry with exponential backoff plus jitter, capped at N attempts, then dead-letter. A typical delay schedule:

AttemptDelay
1immediate
25s
35min
430min
52h
65h
710h
8(give up; dead-letter)

Sender retry tests assert the attempt count and the backoff deltas between attempts (Step 3 in SKILL.md). Dead-letter tests assert that after the max attempts the webhook is recorded in a dead-letter store and not retried.

Per-vendor sample payloads

For receiver tests of specific vendors, use the vendor's official sample payloads (or captures from their webhook tester), never hand-rolled fixtures - field names drift from real sends.

  • Stripe: stripe.com/docs/webhooks -> "Sample events"
  • Twilio: twilio.com/docs/usage/webhooks -> per-resource event docs
  • SendGrid: docs.sendgrid.com/for-developers/tracking-events
  • GitHub: docs.github.com/en/webhooks -> per-event payload reference
  • GitLab: docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/project/integrations/webhook_events.html

Related skills

mailpit-testing

The email-testing home: configures and runs Mailpit - modern dev-mailbox server for SMTP testing with built-in REST API for assertions; default SMTP `1025` + Web UI `8025`; Chaos mode (configurable SMTP errors for resilience testing), message tagging, search filters. Carries the end-to-end email-flow workflow (multipart body, link-rewrite resolution, unsubscribe per RFC 8058, bounce + complaint webhooks) in references/email-flows.md and the legacy MailHog capture patterns + migration path in references/mailhog-legacy.md. Use when developing or testing email-sending code locally / in CI - SMTP capture, full-flow assertions, or migrating an existing MailHog deployment.

push-notification-test-author

Build-an-X for push notification tests (push notifications, web push, FCM / APNs push messages) across Web Push (RFC 8030 / VAPID), Apple Push Notification Service (APNs), and Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) - covers subscription handshake, payload encryption, badge / sound / click-action assertions, expired-subscription cleanup, silent-vs-alert, and topic-vs-targeted routing; also carries the in-app notification test workflow (WebSocket / SSE / Firebase-listener delivery, read-unread state, multi-session fan-out, offline-then-reconnect) in references/in-app.md. Use when authoring tests for any push or in-app notification flow.

sms-test-author

Build-an-X for SMS-flow tests - uses Twilio Magic Numbers (`+15005550006` valid recipient, `+15005550001` invalid number, `+15005550002` cannot route, `+15005550003` international restriction, etc.) and Test Credentials for safe assertion-only Twilio interactions; covers segment-counting (GSM-7 vs UCS-2 encoding); rate-limit + opt-out keyword (STOP / HELP / UNSUBSCRIBE) handling; alphanumeric sender vs short-code vs 10DLC differences. Use when authoring tests for any Twilio-backed SMS flow.