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pci-dss-scope-reference

Pure-reference catalog of PCI DSS v4.0 scope reduction techniques + the testable scope boundaries. Covers the SAQ levels (A through D, picked by how cardholder data flows), the PAN-storage prohibitions (only first-6 + last-4 retained; nothing else cleartext), the tokenization + hosted-fields scope-reduction patterns (Stripe Elements / Adyen Drop-in / Braintree Hosted Fields keep PAN off your servers), Network-Segmentation as PCI scope-reduction, and the testable behaviours the scope boundary creates. Distinct from qa-compliance/pci-dss-scope-checker (the compliance / scope-verification skill); this is the catalog of WHY the boundary matters. Use when designing or auditing the PCI scope of a payment integration.

pci-dss-scope-reference

Overview

PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) governs the handling of cardholder data. Per pcisecuritystandards.org, PCI DSS v4.0 is the current spec (replaced v3.2.1 in 2024).

Scope reduction is the dominant strategy: keep card data off your systems entirely, so PCI compliance becomes minimal SAQ A instead of full SAQ D.

This skill is distinct from qa-compliance/pci-dss-scope-checker which verifies the boundary holds in code. This skill explains what the boundary IS and the test surface it creates.

When to use

  • Designing a new payment integration.
  • Auditing existing scope (PAN flowing through your servers?).
  • Choosing a gateway / tokenization strategy.
  • PR review of payment-related changes.

SAQ levels (Self-Assessment Questionnaire)

Per pcisecuritystandards.org:

SAQDescriptionScope
ACard-not-present, fully outsourced (hosted gateway pages, iFrame redirects, Stripe Elements)Smallest - your servers never see PAN
A-EPHosted-form-with-merchant-customisation (e.g., your domain shows the form but iframe is the gateway's)Slightly larger; some elements visible to your server
BPayment terminals only (POS)N/A for web-only
CWeb-based merchants with stored cardholder dataMostly POS-related
DAll merchants not covered by A-C; full PCI DSSLargest - for cases where you must handle PAN

Choose A when feasible. The architecture difference: A requires that PAN never touches your servers - the customer inputs it directly into a gateway-hosted iframe / element.

PAN storage rules

Per PCI DSS v4.0 §3.4: prohibited storage of:

  • Full PAN cleartext anywhere
  • Sensitive authentication data (full track, CVV/CVC, PIN/PIN block) post-authorisation
  • More than first-6 + last-4 digits in any retained data (truncated)

Allowed:

  • First-6 + last-4 digits (truncated PAN)
  • Tokens issued by the gateway (e.g., Stripe pm_*)
  • Encrypted PAN with strong key management (if you must store full PAN)

Tests for storage:

-- Detect prohibited PAN patterns
SELECT * FROM <any_table>
WHERE column ~ '^[0-9]{16}$' OR column ~ '^4[0-9]{15}$'
LIMIT 10;
-- Expect: 0 rows

Scope-reduction patterns

1. Hosted fields / Elements

Per stripe.com/docs/payments/payment-element, docs.adyen.com/online-payments/web-drop-in, developer.paypal.com/braintree/docs/start/hosted-fields:

<!-- Stripe Element -->
<form>
  <div id="payment-element"></div>   <!-- iframe; PAN stays in Stripe's iframe -->
  <button>Pay</button>
</form>

PAN never reaches your JS or backend. The Element sends to Stripe directly; your server gets a token.

2. Redirect-to-gateway

Customer redirects to gateway-hosted page; pays; redirects back with a token / transaction ID.

PCI-friendly because PAN never on your domain. UX-tradeoff: slower, less branded.

3. Tokenization API

Backend-to-backend: customer submits PAN to gateway directly (via JS); gateway returns token; your code uses token.

Variants per gateway: Stripe setupIntent for saved cards; Adyen paymentMethods.storeDetails; PayPal Vault.

4. Network segmentation

If you must touch PAN, isolate it in a separate network with strict ingress / egress + monitoring. Reduces scope of the broader IT environment.

Testable behaviours

BehaviourTest
No 16-digit numbers in DBSQL regex against all string columns
No CVV / CVC storedSearch code for cvc, cvv, cardholderVerification
Hosted fields render without exposing PAN to your JSBrowser DevTools Network tab - no PAN in requests to your origin
Webhooks contain tokens not PANParse webhook payloads; assert no 16-digit numbers
Log scrubbingTest logs for PAN patterns; should be redacted
Backup snapshots PAN-freeSame regex against backup files
Egress firewall blocks card-network IPsNetwork test

The qa-compliance/pci-dss-scope-checker skill runs these adversarially. This skill provides the catalog.

Anti-patterns

Anti-patternWhy it failsFix
Log entire payment request bodyPAN in logsScrub at log emit
Stage card-collection on your own pageCards now in your domain → SAQ DUse hosted fields
Send PAN to backend then forward to gatewayServer now PCI-scopeDirect JS-to-gateway
Store PAN encrypted "just in case"Key management is half of PCI DSSUse tokens
Test PAN in fixturesReal PAN in commitsUse only platform-provided test PANs
Capture CVV server-sidePCI DSS v4.0 §3.2.1: prohibited post-authDon't capture or capture in scoped iframe
Skip scope-checker in CIDrift over timePeriodic scope audit

Limitations

  • PCI DSS v4.0 is paywalled (cite by stable ID). Gateway docs paraphrase the relevant clauses.
  • Scope is a moving target. Adding a new feature can pull PAN into your system; re-audit on architecture changes.
  • PCI compliance ≠ PCI security. Compliance is a baseline; actual security needs more (threat modeling, pentest, etc.).
  • Doesn't cover PA-DSS (Payment Application DSS for POS software).

References